Afghanistan has been plagued with decades of war, the Taliban, poverty, the opium trade, warlords, rampant corruption, and a dubious election. Now we hear it may have up to $1 trillion in natural resources like gold, lithium and iron.
Will Afghanistan add the resource curse to its troubles? Some pundits scoffed that the minerals had been known about for years. Some said it would be used as an excuse for the US to stay longer in the country. Many argue the war has already been lost so who cares about mining? Mining could be an incentive to the Taliban or worsen corruption.
But could mining actually save Afghanistan? If handled strategically, yes. Handled wrong, these resources can ruin the environment, further infuriate the population against the government, and increase corruption exponentially. But with a different approach, the government really can use mining to enhance the economy, weaken the Taliban, and lessen corruption.
How? Think locally. Most resource problems stem from the nearly universal exclusive ownership national governments (except America) have of all subsurface resources. Because the faraway government controls all the money and decisions, corruption, environmental and financial mismanagement, and the temptation to ignore local wishes are overwhelming.
Involving the local people changes this dynamic. The Afghan government must include local people as real partners who have a say in and profit from each mining project. By doing this will do what no counterinsurgency effort can do alone: offer the people something worth fighting for and a way to regain control over their lives and country.
Recently, I tracked a particularly diligent group of US farmers as they struggled over leasing their land for natural gas development. Some might dismiss anything American out-of-hand. But the world over, information about extraction projects — the environmental risks, the resource’s value, the actual extraction process — is notoriously unavailable to the public, and it was in this situation. The group (several hundred) did research and spread the information they found by rural word-of-mouth networks and the internet. They themselves developed the terms for leasing their land, and, after two years, selected the petroleum company they felt best for them. Interestingly, they did not choose the company with the highest initial bonus payment (although they still received a good amount of money), but the one they felt best addressed their environmental concerns and seemed most open to a cooperative relationship. Informed, they made a better decision than any outsider could have made for them.
Although extraction companies promise huge numbers of new jobs during the bidding process, the real job gains for the local population are often more modest. The Afghan government needs to ensure not only jobs in mining and the supply end but also to guarantee a healthy percentage of the bonus and royalties goes in some mutually agreed-to form to the local population. Ultimately, this could offer the area available capital to develop new businesses or local infrastructure.
This is also why it could work long-term against the Taliban. Last year, after decades of fighting over oil income and environmental damage, the Nigerian government brokered a peace deal with the rebels in the oil-rich Niger River delta, offering job training and a $13 daily stipend in exchange for disarmament, along with the promise of $1.3 billion in new local infrastructure. It’s estimated more that 15,000 rebels turned in their guns.
But the opposite is also true. In 2008, Peru sought to open millions of undeveloped acres in the Amazon basin for exploration and investment. It ignored the environmental and cultural concerns of the indigenous people. After a year, the government had a full-blown violent uprising on its hands with 30 dead, and it repealed the offending laws.
Finally, transparency and local oversight lessens the opportunity for wholesale corruption. By making the local population real partners, you equip them with the right to check the books for their royalties. Earlier this year, amid allegations of corruption during the bidding for the giant Anyak copper mine, the Afghan government signed on to the World Bank-backed Extractive Industries’ Transparency Initiative to open their books. It’s only a first step, but it’s a good first step.
Each resource country has its own unique challenges, especially Afghanistan. The government and the companies involved will have to work hard to minimize ethnic and class tensions and rivalries, and to minimize the environmental impact of mining, especially land reclamation and water supply. Not all the minerals deposits will be large or profitable enough for international interest. The Taliban has already some control over smaller mines; a good deal of strategic thinking will have to go into security measures for new ones.
Fortunately, mining resources take time to develop. If it has the political will, the Afghan government can bring in local support and put in place sound environmental protections and financial structures. The outcome in Afghanistan is not inevitable, not the war and not the resource curse.
